

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

SUBJECT: NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure Organizational Study -  
Interagency Group/Countermeasures Tasking

25X1 1. The DCI, as Chairman, NSC/SIG-1, has directed that the IG/CM conduct a study to determine what organizational and structural impediments prevent the (U.S. Government) from countering the non-HUMINT intelligence threat to the United States. The study is an outgrowth of NSSD/2, of February 1982; the results will be reviewed by the SIG-1, and then forwarded to the NSC and the President. [ ] of the IC Staff's Community Counterintelligence Staff, has been appointed Study Director. He, in turn, is asking that you identify a principal representative by 18 January 1983, who would act as the Agency's focal point for the Study.

2. The Chairman, IG/CM, has forwarded to us Terms of Reference and an outline and sub-outline for the Study. The suggested Study approach is interdisciplinary, but has a heavy concentration on security-related items. It covers warning mechanisms against hostile technical collectors, technical collection countermeasures of all types ranging from COMSEC through camouflage and concealment to TEMPEST, OPSEC and TSCM; then ranges on through personnel, information, physical and industrial security, provides for a summary of existing countermeasures structures in the Government, and concludes with possibilities for improvement.

3. The proposed study is wide-ranging in content, but concentrates to a considerable extent on technical disciplines. It is suggested, therefore, that a senior representative of the PTAS Directorate be identified as the Agency's principal representative/focal point.

4. There will be an initial meeting of the overall Study Group scheduled for sometime later in January 1983. It would appear that considerable staffing and involvement of Office of Security personnel resources might be required to complete the Study. The Study could result in a major listing of vulnerabilities of the Intelligence Community, and would be an exceptionally sensitive document. It could also require a good deal of "dirty linen" analysis and review. More will be known in that regard when the Study Group members report on the results of their first meeting. Our representative at that meeting should be in a position to commit the Office of Security to specific courses of action. Hence, senior level participation is recommended at that first gathering.

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